I was privileged to deliver this year’s Wellington Lecture at the University of Southampton, and here’s the text of the lecture:
Introduction
Some time in the summer of 1945 Captain Alf Smith, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, staff officer 21st Army Group, Brussels HQ, spent a day south of the city sightseeing. He toured the battlefield at Waterloo, but it was some time after the 130th anniversary commemoration on 18 June 1945. I know my dad was there because he had his batman/driver take a photograph of him standing with a big grin on his face in front of the Lion Mound. My father left school at 14, his prowess at cricket helping considerably to secure his commission. The chances are that he knew very little about the Duke of Wellington other than that he gave Napoleon a bloody nose. What he did know was that from the winter of 1944 the killing fields of Waterloo – and my dad knew all about killing fields – was, in today’s parlance, the go-to experience for any British soldier with a keen sense of history.
For many officers, especially regulars, Waterloo was a place of pilgrimage. For veterans of the Great War, visiting the battlefield had been impossible until late 1918. Why? Because in August 1914 the Germans had so rapidly secured control of the Belgian capital and its hinterland. In the winter and spring of 1939-40 a visit was out of the question: members of the BEF – the British Expeditionary Force – were strictly forbidden to cross the border into Belgium, a then neutral country. The speed of the German offensive in May 1940 ruled out any British excursion to Waterloo until liberation over four years later.
How ironic that, while the British were denied access to the Waterloo battlefield throughout the First World War and most of the Second World War, the Germans for much of this time enjoyed easy access.
In German history the Battle of Waterloo is known as La Belle Alliance, named after the inn where the victors – Wellington and Blucher – met on the evening of 18 June. The name is bitter-sweet given the pivot in British foreign policy on the cusp of the last century which led in due course to the 1904 signing of the entente cordiale. For the next ten years Berlin endeavoured to disrupt the entente, using a mix of threats and promises to try and resurrect a belle alliance with London, the Wilhelmstrasse still seeing the British as Germany’s most natural ally.
Waterloo was a site which many if not all nineteenth-century Germans had treated with a reverence not dissimilar to that of their one-time ally and future implacable foe. Many but not all Germans: for Hannover and Brunswick, with their close English connections, Waterloo was the great battle of the Napoleonic wars; whereas for other member states in the German Confederation and later the German Empire, the Battle of Leipzig, fought in 1813, was deemed the key moment in nation-building.
Nevertheless, career officers in Berlin recognised the significance of Waterloo as a coda to the succession of land battles which the Prussian general staff had been obsessed with since Clausewitz wrote On War. On 18 June 1815 troops such as the Hanoverian Brigade and the King’s German Legion had performed heroically in resisting successive French assaults – incredibly, some 155,000 of the 209,000 Allied troops were German-speaking.
Had Blucher arrived earlier in the day then the Prussian and later the German Army would have hailed Waterloo as one of its greatest triumphs.
Kaiser Wilhelm II did precisely that in 1903 when praising Hanoverian soldiers for in his rewrite of history saving their British comrades from annihilation. In 1915 Hannover was unique in marking the battle’s centenary. A museum exhibition and a well-attended ceremony at the city’s Waterloo Column together confirmed the Kaiser’s version of events – without the brave Germans, Napoleon had the measure of Wellington. The rest of the wartime Reich ignored the anniversary, reinforcing Leipzig’s precedence over Waterloo in the nation’s shared memory. Hannover’s next collective engagement with the battle came half a century later. In June 1965 citizens with long memories and an unease over offending their French allies inside the EEC and NATO watched uncomfortably as British troops marched through the city in a commemorative parade.
‘Wellington and two world wars – the German perspective’ is clearly a fascinating topic, but one I must leave for experts in the field like Brendan Simms and Jasper Heinzen. Instead, I’ll focus on the British military, while noting the muted civilian commemoration of the 100th and 130th anniversaries of Waterloo in 1915 and 1945.
The centennial came at a grim moment in the early years of the Great War, with casualties mounting on the Gallipoli beachheads, and in Belgium where the original BEF had with great loss of life seen off a renewed German attack on Ypres. The 130th anniversary occurred at the start of the 1945 general election campaign, and with the initial euphoria of VE Day muted by the expectation that British forces, boosted by reinforcements from Europe, would be fighting the Japanese for months into years.
It’s easy to dismiss Wellington’s legacy when considering how Britain in the 20th century twice adapted to the multi-faceted demands of what many label ‘total war’, but which – like Hew Strachan and others – I prefer to call ‘industrial war’: what relevance can a general from Napoleonic times, however great, have to the First and Second World War – very different conflicts fought on a vastly different scale and in very different circumstance and conditions? I don’t want to over-state my case, but I would simply say, ‘More than you might think.’ To substantiate that claim I want to consider three over-lapping areas:
Firstly, and most straightforwardly, the visible legacy: Wellington and Waterloo in the landscape of war, whether on the Home Front or within the armed forces.
Secondly, I want to consider the legacy of Wellington with reference to military doctrine, and continuing areas of debate re morale and combat effectiveness in the British Army by the summer of 1944. Time prevents me from going into great detail, but I can signal the continued saliency of these issues.
Thirdly, and most obviously, which generals in both world wars can be compared with the Duke – in what ways, and why.
Having addressed these three areas then I hope you will agree with me that examining multiple connections between the first Duke of Wellington and Britain’s involvement in the two seismic conflicts of the 20th century is no idle exercise – so let’s begin.
The visibility of Wellington and Waterloo within a wartime environment
Reminders of the Duke of Wellington and his best-known battle were ever present in 1914-18 and again in 1939-45, not least in the capital. Thousands of military and non-military personnel passed through Waterloo Station, the key transit point in both world wars. For those not from the south of England this was often a novel experience, a crowded and unfamiliar concourse only adding to the mixture of apprehension and anticipation felt by all. Perhaps they drank a last, pre-embarkation pint at the Wellington Hotel, across the road from the station. Just across the river in Westminster stood Wellington Barracks, but even in wartime this was largely the preserve of regular Guardsmen – the impressive building’s significance once the Blitz began lay in the fact that Buckingham Palace still required guarding, the Royal Family having chosen to remain in London.
The Army’s most lasting link to the Duke of Wellington was the regiment named in his memory. Formed in 1853 from a veteran unit of the Peninsular War, the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment spawned multiple battalions in both world wars. They fought with distinction in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Far East; the 2nd Battalion even fighting behind enemy lines in Burma as part of Orde Wingate’s Chindits. The 6th Duke of Wellington – killed at Salerno in September 1943 – had held a commission in his namesake regiment prior to joining the Commandos.
However, as we’ll see, the 6th Battalion’s resilience under fire triggered a wider debate re the combat effectiveness of British troops endeavouring to break out of the Normandy beachhead.
The RAF boasted not one but two bombers named after the Duke. Less well known was the Vickers Wellesley, a single-engine monoplane which saw action against the Italians in East Africa in 1940-41, during which time its vulnerability became obvious to all who flew it – never was an aircraft less appropriately named. The Wellesley boasted a geodetic airframe, devised by designer Barnes Wallis from his work on the R100 airship.
The same principle of construction was employed on the Vickers Wellington, the twin-engine bomber which was the mainstay of Bomber Command until 1942. In production from 1936 to 1945, more Wellingtons were built than any other bomber. It’s Wellingtons that are seen being constructed in Humphrey Jennings’ 1941 documentary Heart of Britain, and it’s a Wellington that is shot down over Holland in Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger’s 1942 feature film One of Our Aircraft Is Missing. RAF propaganda freely associated the Wellington with the Iron Duke, ignoring the inconvenient fact that – like the Stirling, Lancaster, Halifax, etc – prewar Bomber Command named its aircraft after towns and cities.
The Royal Navy boasted an HMS Wellington and an HMS Duke of Wellington during the Second World War, but these were largely names of convenience, for an escort sloop and a converted landing craft. HMS Waterloo would have been a large, state-of-the-art destroyer, but the order was cancelled in 1945.
The Senior Service’s most famous salute to the hero of Waterloo were the four Iron Duke-class Dreadnoughts laid down before the First World War. The actual HMS Iron Duke was the flagship of the Grand Fleet.
In May 1916 Southampton’s own Admiral Sir John Jellicoe commanded the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland from the bridge of the Iron Duke. The battleship saw almost continuous action for eight years from 1914 to 1922, but unhappily spent most of the Second World War as a beached gun platform in Scapa Flow. By comparison, HMS Nelson – a smaller battleship launched in 1925 – saw near continuous action.
For the Royal Navy Horatio Nelson was of course a regular point of reference in both world wars. Sir John Jellicoe’s caution at Jutland as losses mounted earned begrudging approval postwar, but in 1916 his critics were insistent that Nelson would have kept fighting. That criticism was given tacit approval by David Beatty, who as commander of the Grand Fleet’s Battlecruiser Squadron cultivated an image designed to draw parallels with Nelson, and whose remarkable capacity for self-promotion culminated in his appointment as First Sea Lord.
If the Royal Navy was sensitive over its surface fleet’s record in the First World War the same could not be said of the Second where admirers hailed Andrew Cunningham as Britain’s greatest fighting admiral since Nelson. Cunningham’s morale-boosting victories in the Mediterranean ensured his appointment as First Sea Lord in late 1943: every year the Royal Navy commemorates the victory at Trafalgar, but in addition the Fleet Air Arm celebrates the devastating attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto in November 1940.
The power of the Nelson myth with the Royal Navy prompts comparisons re Wellington and the British Army. One obvious question is: does Waterloo have the same centrality within the service psyche as Trafalgar, not least in wartime?
The simple answer is clearly yes, but not as in the Navy a service-wide commemoration year on year: recognition of the great day rests with those regiments whose battle honours include ‘Waterloo’. Cavalry regiments enthusiastically celebrate 18 June, not least because their histories highlight the clearest lines of continuity.
However, it’s hard to imagine during the Second World War say the 1st and 2nd Household Cavalry Regiments finding time to toast their illustrious antecedents in the saddle – except possibly in 1943 between the end of the North African campaign and the invasion of Sicily. If so, the future 8th Duke of Wellington may well have orchestrated the Royal Horse Guards’ anniversary celebration.
For regular cavalry regiments in 21st Army Group the end of the war in Europe meant that they could mark the 130th anniversary of Waterloo in style – the same being true for the Guards and the Rifle Brigade. One wonders how intense these celebrations were outside the mess, and beyond a now shrunken cadre of regulars?
Wellington and military doctrine
In August 1914 the Peninsular War was the last campaign the British Army could consider a clear victory. The same could not be said for the Crimean War, where Wellington cast a long shadow, or for the Boer War. Yet cavalry tactics honed during the Napoleonic wars, and severely tested in Crimea and South Africa, proved remarkably resilient; not least because it was largely cavalrymen who in the Edwardian era moulded military doctrine and training methods. By October 1914 all these ideas were obsolete, albeit resurrected to a degree between the wars. Trench warfare meant few if any British generals found themselves asking ‘What would Wellington do?’. The same was even more the case in 1939-45.
Occasionally a military historian has asked ‘What would Wellington have done?’ – John Keegan, for example. Not that Wellington’s legacy is always viewed in a positive light. Brian Bond and David French both attributed an absence of initiative and quick thinking on the battlefield to an inflexible, top-down system of command and control that was traceable straight back to the Duke. For the BEF one hundred years on from Waterloo, fighting on the Western Front consolidated an unquestioning adherence by subordinate commanders to the prevailing ‘master plan’.
David French paralleled the evolution of British military doctrine with nineteenth-century industrialisation, arguing that by 1915 Douglas Haig and his fellow generals sought to impose regularity and order on a chaotic battlefield, through strict adherence to certain overriding principles and practices of war, in the same way as industrialists ran their factories.
Today, former generals like Rupert Smith and Richard Dannatt argue that the reversals of 1940-42 confirmed the resilience of an ethos that penalised rapid response to changing circumstances.
Ironically, much of the historiographical debate over the morale and combat performance of British infantry in Normandy – where attrition rates significantly exceeded those of the Western Front – focus upon the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, and specifically the 6th Battalion. The Regiment’s other battalions all fought with distinction throughout the Second World War. However, in July 1944 Montgomery disbanded the 6th following a damning report on why command and cohesion of the battalion had completely collapsed. In his 1984 bestseller Overlord Max Hastings focused on the 6th Battalion fleeing the front line. He saw this as confirmation of the German generals’ claim that raw British troops and exhausted veterans of the Eighth Army were demonstrably inferior to their adversaries – in other words, that victory for 21st Army Group came solely through superior firepower and air supremacy.
A more nuanced view, by historians like David French and John Buckley, questioned Max Hastings’ readiness to generalise about the calibre of British infantry on the strength of one painful incident. They pointed to:
- the battle-hardened forces facing the 6th Battalion – a Panzergrenadier Regiment of the 12. SS Division ‘Hitler Jugend’;
- the Battalion’s 50% losses from 6 June to the end of that month, which included the commanding officer, his adjutant, every company commander, and the majority of subalterns;
- the 7th Battalion was similarly untested in combat when deployed alongside the 6th in Normandy, but it survived crippling casualties and kept fighting.
For these reasons the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment is no longer synonymous with a damning revisionist view of how well British infantry battalions fought in NW Europe in 1944-45.
Meanwhile modern bestsellers like James Holland’s Brothers In Arms have maintained the reputation of British armour. A Yeomanry regiment of cavalry like Nottinghamshire’s Sherwood Rangers would have been instantly recognisable to the Duke in 1939. Yet within two years they had become a frontline force in the Desert War – and then reinvented themselves to fight in very different conditions from Normandy to the Baltic.
It was the Sherwood Rangers who were fighting alongside the 6th Battalion of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment in Le Parc de Boislonde on 17-18 June 1944 when the DWR suffered its catastrophic baptism of fire – note the date. Stanley Christopherson, the Sherwood Rangers’ commanding officer, wrote in his diary:
‘The Duke of Wellingtons, with whom we were holding this high ground, took a bad hammering and retreated without orders, leaving its anti-tank guns and equipment, some of which were captured in a counterattack.’
That counterattack involved the 7th Battalion, which maintained the honour of the Regiment on the 129th anniversary of Waterloo. Stanley Christopherson had been promoted to lieutenant colonel and given command of the Sherwood Rangers on the eve of the battle, as everyone senior to him was either dead or wounded.
In North Africa, but even more so in NW Europe, tank regiments experienced a turnover of officers, NCOs and Troopers which even Wellington post-Waterloo would have found staggering.
Which British generals from the two world wars can be spoken of in the same breath as the Iron Duke?
As to generals mentioned in the same breath as the Iron Duke the easiest answer is to say none. Posing the question appears to presume a pyramid of British martial achievement which sees Wellington and Marlborough contesting the apex, with other victorious commanders – from Cromwell to Edward III, Wolfe to Haig – some distance below. Crudely ranking military leaders across a millennium in this way is clearly absurd.
A more nuanced approach, limited to the two world wars, is to look for parallels between Wellington and those commanders in the field who displayed similar leadership qualities of:
personality, empathy, motivation, organisation, imagination, innovation, risk management, endurance, strategic vision, tactical nous and flair for alliance diplomacy.
Such a unique and comprehensive set of skills signals a very short list of candidates, with none of them matching the Duke’s claim to them all.
Wellington and Alanbrooke
Note my qualification of commanders in the field. Unfairly, this discounts Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff 1941-46, a truly outstanding chief of staff who, to appease the Americans, was forced to forego appointment as Supreme Commander for ‘Overlord’ in favour of Eisenhower. Like Wellington – and a number of generals in both world wars, including Montgomery – Alan Brooke was born into the Anglo-Irish ‘Ascendancy’. His masterly control of II [Second] Corps’ retreat to Dunkirk in May-June 1940 has echoes of Wellington’s retreat from Burgos to Cuidad Rodrigo in the autumn of 1812.
The Duke would have thoroughly approved, in contrast to an earlier II Corps’ far more costly retreat from Mons to the Marne in August-September 1914 – Wellington would have condemned the losses sustained at Le Cateau while recognising and applauding the BEF riflemen’s sharp-shooting skills. I’m sure experts on Waterloo would want me at this point to note the presence of an even earlier Second Corps, commanded by Lord Hill, on 18 June 1815.
Incidentally, staff officers of the BEF did find time on 25 October 1915 to commemorate with their French counterparts the five hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Agincourt. I’m grateful to my colleague Anne Curry for pointing this out. The village of Azincourt was roughly halfway between the Channel and Loos, where the failure of the recent offensive necessitated a symbolic reaffirmation of the entente cordiale. The Allies’ absence from the plains of Waterloo had of course prevented a similar centennial ceremony of reconciliation the previous June.
Alan Brooke was a ‘Gunner’ and in the Great War too busy planning creeping barrages to take part in affirmations of la grande alliance, but as a bilingual product of the French education system he was uniquely qualified to celebrate the metamorphosis of historic adversaries into resolute allies.
Wellington and Montgomery
However outstanding Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke undoubtedly was, our exercise demands we look to frontline generals. Bernard Montgomery, a brilliant self-publicist, clearly established himself in the popular consciousness as Britain’s most successful general in the Second World War. From El Alamein in the autumn of 1942 through to his death in 1976 he enjoyed a unique level of popular recognition, and doubtless there are many who would maintain his claim to be the nation’s greatest general since Wellington – he certainly thought so!
Yet even prior to his death Montgomery’s decision-making in NW Europe, from ‘Operation Goodwood’ to ‘Operation Market Garden’, was subject to rigorous reappraisal, with often highly critical conclusions. Has Wellington’s Peninsular campaign been subject to the same level of critique? I suspect not. Wellington wasn’t short of self-confidence, but he couldn’t boast an ego as big as Montgomery’s (or indeed Mountbatten’s), and crucially he displayed an aptitude for alliance diplomacy which the commander of 21st Army Group demonstrably lacked. In this respect the Duke’s political skills draw comparison with Alanbrooke’s – however contemptuous of your allies you take a deep breath and smile (and that night vent your feelings on paper).
In Brussels, Montgomery’s Intelligence Chief used the example of Wellington to warn his boss off pontificating on the postwar world at a time when the war was far from won:
‘…the fact that the Duke of Wellington won the Battle of Waterloo, just down the road, didn’t stop his windows being stoned when he turned politician.’
Monty took on board Brigadier Williams’ timely words. [H, 122-3] He also went off to tour the battlefield, drawing on the experience in December 1944: during the Ardennes counter-offensive he sent a delusional Brian Horrocks home on leave when the commander of XXX Corps wanted the Germans to advance as far west as Waterloo so that this time around they would find themselves on the losing side. [H, 232]
In Montgomery’s A History of Warfare, published in 1968, he attributed success in Spain largely to the endurance and fortitude of the ordinary British soldier, and victory at Waterloo to the negligence of an ailing Bonaparte ie not primarily to the quality of command. Montgomery labelled Wellington ‘the best soldier Britain has produced for many a long day,’ but only a sentence later unequivocally nominated Nelson as the architect of Napoleon’s ultimate demise.
Of far greater interest to Montgomery was the Duke of Marlborough, his status as a military ‘genius’ not unconnected to the fact that the Field Marshal found parallels between his own experience on the battlefield and that of Churchill’s illustrious ancestor.
Wellington and Slim
To his credit, in A History of Warfare Montgomery was generous in his praise of Field Marshal Lord Slim, highlighting more than once ‘Bill’ Slim’s tactical brilliance in recovering Burma from the Japanese.
If any general of the Second World War can lay claim to Wellington’s mantle is it ‘Uncle Bill’, who from 1943 forged the 14th Army – the ‘Forgotten Army’ – into a formidable fighting force?
Of the 13 divisions that comprised the 14th Army, 8 were Indian, 2 were British, and 3 African (with a similar ratio for autonomous British and Indian brigades).
Consider Wellington’s composite army at the Battle of Assaye, which the Duke more than once spoke of as his greatest victory – on 23 September 1803 he commanded just three British regiments. However, the complementary forces of the East India Company were overwhelmingly indigenous.
The then Major-General Wellesley: –
trusted and respected his Indian troops;
made shrewd appointments of commanders in the field;
laid out clear objectives to both officers and men;
focused on the well-being of his forces on and off the battlefield;
valued high quality intelligence;
and made himself visible on the frontline.
Here were the foundational principles on which he fought the Peninsular War, and on which Slim led his men – and women – from Bengal to Rangoon. A further parallel is both generals’ reliance on irregular forces, whether Spanish guerillas or Chindits and Burmese nationalists. Also, like Wellington and unlike Montgomery, Slim could serve as a team player if necessary – as in his partnership with Mountbatten, C-in-C South-East Asia Command.
Wellington and Allenby
In the First World War – unlike the Crimea or even the Boer War – Wellington was rarely seen as a guide for generals on the Western Front; if he could serve as a role model then it was in logistical operations and the maintenance of morale behind the lines.
How the Duke would have raged at the appalling consequences of poor leadership on the Dardanelles, albeit exempting colonial commanders like Birdwood and Monash; and yet how he would have loved to command the Allied offensive of 1917-18 designed to destroy Turkish power in the Levant and the Arabian peninsula.
Here again was a multi-national force, with extended lines of communication and supply stretching from the Suez Canal to the Beqaa Valley, and a commitment to reconciling speed and mobility with the deployment of maximum force. Palestine was the last great cavalry campaign, but for gunners and infantry a further manifestation of ‘industrial war’ utilising all necessary components to secure absolute victory.
Overseeing this grand assault on Ottoman hegemony was the future Field Marshal Viscount Allenby, a cavalryman whose prewar CV Wellington would have found not that dissimilar to his own. Like the Duke in the Peninsula, and Bill Slim in Burma, Edmund Allenby placed a premium on maintaining the morale and physical well-being of troops a long way from home and fighting in a hostile and alien environment. Allenby was notoriously short-tempered, but the political acuity he demonstrated in Palestine, let alone his obvious capacity for supreme command, would surely have earned him Wellington’s approval.
Conclusion
By now it’s clear that, even if Wellington lacked the same mythical status across the Army that Nelson enjoyed within the Royal Navy, he nevertheless was an ever-present within service life – not least for regular officers and other ranks keenly aware of regimental history and tradition. His name, like that of the battle for which he is best known, was a recognised part of wartime Britain; even if for much of the time civilians scarcely registered the Duke’s long shadow. His name and image also of course had an imperial presence, which Miles Taylor explored in an earlier Wellington Lecture. No previous general, including Cromwell and Marlborough, had experienced the same intensity of memorialisation as Wellington, and the only postwar equivalent is Mountbatten – like Nelson a sailor.
While generals like Bill Slim or Edmund Allenby would only look to Wellington as a point of historical reference, it’s hard to believe Montgomery did not on occasion look for comparisons with the Duke – even if, as already noted, after the war it was John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough whose campaigns he saw parallels with.
Unlike the First, the Second World War lends itself to imagining a modern Arthur Wellesley forging his reputation as a great commander:
earning his spurs in France, with plaudits for getting his division to Dunkirk intact;
proving a worthy foe for Rommel in North Africa;
and partnering the Americans in the great invasion of continental Europe and the long road to the Luneburg Heath.
No wonder Monty drew parallels, even if he and Wellington bore the burden of command very differently – as already suggested, the Duke’s dealings with the Americans and the other Allied commanders would have displayed a good deal more patience and political nous. Wellington’s relations with Alanbrooke as Chief of the Imperial General Staff might have been more testy, as the CIGS would not have been as protective as he was towards Monty.
In Downing Street from July 1945 it’s hard to imagine veteran company commander Major Attlee having much time for the hauteur of Sir Arthur (‘Dukedom? Out of the question!’), but what about before July 1945?
Imagine the late night brandy-fuelled conversations of the Prime Minister and General Wellesley: the martial feats of Churchill’s illustrious ancestor; the attractions of mutual female acquaintances; the hottest curry house in Calcutta; the finer points of polo; the soothing qualities of a good cigar; the hidden depths of the British working man and woman; the iniquities of socialism; the respective merits of Goya and Velasquez – the list would go on, and on.
We can only speculate on a fantasy marriage made in heaven. One thing we can be fairly sure of: at Churchill’s darkest moments during the war, whether the surrender of France, the surrender of Tobruk or the surrender of Singapore, he surely drank deep the whisky and soda, inhaled hard on the Havana, and cried out, ‘Where is my Wellington?’.
There was no second Wellington, but in both the Second and the First World Wars the Duke’s finest qualities could be found in a myriad of different combinations in a variety of service men and women, from the most elevated general to the humblest private.
Similarly, in both world wars there were British and colonial forces who Wellington would have taken pride in commanding, from the BEF in 1918 to the Eighth Army in 1943, from the ANZACs at Suvla Bay to 6th Airborne at the Pegasus Bridge.
Waterloo may have entered the national psyche, remembered if at all just once a year, but the leadership, courage and sacrifice displayed on 18 June 1815 was no less in evidence a century or more later.