

The Bifurcation of Politics: The Impact of Cosmopolitan versus Shrinking Urban Dynamics

Gerry Stoker University of Canberra/Southampton

Will Jennings, University of Southampton

Paper for the European Urban Research Association conference, Sibiu, Romania

Transforming cities, transformative cities, 17-20 September 2015

The idea that uneven development is characteristic of liberal capitalism is hardly novel but in this paper we push the argument a little further and argue that increasingly the urban setting is a tale of two types of city. One urban trajectory is connected to the emergence of global city regions as powerful actors in the new political economy of a globalized world (Scott, 2001; Sassen, 2001; Scott and Storper, 2015). These locations and other boom towns and cities have found a niche in the new global order. They are highly connected, decidedly innovative, well-networked, attracting skilled populations, often supported by inward migration, and display the qualities of “cosmopolitan” urbanism. The other urban type is focused on “shrinking” cities and regions. These are ‘towns, cities and entire regions are experiencing the outflow of capital and human resources, and are suffering from a lack of entrepreneurship and low levels of innovation and intellectual engagement’ (Martinez-Fernandez, 2012: 213-4). Urban politics as a result is dividing, reflecting the emergence of growing cosmopolitan and shrinking urban settlements, and in turn creating a dynamic of divergent outlooks among citizens that threatens existing national political formulas and the ambitions of global economic elites. At the same time it offers new but complex opportunities for urban leaders in the context of the rescaling of politics.

This paper is about establishing and understanding the bifurcation of politics driven by patterns of urban change. The argument is developed in four parts. First we examine the dynamic of change that sees urban settlements increasingly divided between cosmopolitan and shrinking dynamics. Second the details of the research design and survey are presented. The empirical heart of the paper is a specifically designed nationally representative survey undertaken in Britain in 2015¹ to test how social and political outlooks and behaviour in cosmopolitan and shrinking areas compared to each other and the general population. Third we show how two polar dynamics of political attitudes and behaviour are being set loose by these developments among citizens in these urban contexts. We are also able to demonstrate that urban context matters; divergent urban experiences are pushing citizens in different directions. Fourth, we discuss how the emergence of cosmopolitan and shrinking urbanism has the potential to change the politics of contemporary democracies profoundly.

¹ The survey was funded through financial support provided to Professor Stoker by the University of Canberra, Australia as part of his Centenary Research Professorship. Several of the survey questions were trialled in early research work funded by the University of Southampton. We are grateful for the funding from both sources and to Laurence Stelling of Populus for assistance in survey design. Special thanks to Ian Warren for help in the use of Mosaic geodemographic data and analysis.

A Dynamic for Change

Agglomeration and specialization are the shared qualities of the urban but not all cities and their environs are the same. History, events and culture matter as well as location in the broader North/South global divide; although the extent of variety or ‘new particularism’ should not be exaggerated (Scott and Storper, 2015). There are many potential divisions that could be drawn between urban settings but in this paper the focus proposed is the growing divide between cosmopolitan towns and cities and shrinking urban conurbations, where the dynamic of global competition is seen driving both developments. As Martinez-Fernandez et al (2012: 214) comment: ‘globalization stimulates the mobility of people across countries and regions, with some communities being at the sending end (resulting in shrinkage of their population), while other areas experience net gains’.

Cosmopolitan centres are the gainers in a new system of global production, manufacturing, distribution and consumption that has led to new urban forms made possible by the revolution in logistics and new technologies. These centres are marked by their intellectual assets, cultural strength and the capacity of their infrastructure to attract people, ideas and skills. These global urban centres are highly connected, highly innovative, well-networked, attracting skilled populations, often supported by inward migration, and display the qualities of cosmopolitan urbanism. Simultaneously, other towns, cities and entire regions are experiencing the outflow of capital and human resources, and are suffering from a lack of entrepreneurship, low levels of innovation, cultural nostalgia and disconnectedness from the values of the metropolitan elite, and are largely ignored by policy-makers. These shrinking urban locations are the other side of the coin; for them the story is of being left behind as old industries die or as old roles become obsolete, human and physical infrastructure decays, and as successive governments have left them to fend for themselves. Populations may be declining, the skilled workers and the young are leaving in search of opportunity (reinforcing the cycle of decline) and these places are increasingly disconnected from the dynamic sectors of the economy, as well as the social liberalism of hyper-modern global cities in which the political, economic and media classes plough their furrow.

These developments are not necessarily temporary or transitional. The scale of change is such that the processes that are in operation go beyond cyclical explanations of growth and decline, since the entire system of production, distribution and consumption is being restructured, generating new divides that have an air of solidity. The situation is such that the

position of cosmopolitan cities is self-sustaining and self-reinforcing while shrinking cities cannot easily be dragged into the slipstream of cosmopolitans by policy interventions (Power et al, 2010; Pallagot et al, 2009). The forces that are driving rampant cosmopolitanism are also driving the gradual withering of shrinking conurbations and they are difficult for public policy to direct or control. The result is that urban shrinkage needs to be viewed ‘as a durable, structural component of urban development’ (Martinez-Fernandez et al, 2012: 218).

The forces of change in turn bring with them new identities for citizens that in turn help to reinforce and sustain the character of the new urban divide (Huang, 2006; Sassen, 2002). As Sassen (2005: 92) argues: ‘cities emerge as strategic sites for major economic processes and for new types of political actors. Insofar as citizenship is embedded and in turn marked by its embeddedness, these new conditions may well signal the possibility of new forms of citizenship practices and identities’. The possibility of a new politics emerging from cosmopolitan citizens has been recognized (Norris, 2000) and has been seen as having a radical edge in which the urban becomes a key site for liberating, critical and challenging political trends and social movements (Soja, 2010; Harvey, 2012). But just as relevant is the emergence of “left behind” residents in declining areas who feel neglected and non-engaged by mainstream politics (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).

What this paper explores is the idea that the changing structures of urban areas are reshaping and fracturing politics. Parts of society may be on the fringes of the two polar poles of cosmopolitan and shrinking locations - neither in one camp or the other and not immediately affected by their forces - but it is at these poles where a dynamic has been unleashed that is pulling politics in opposite directions in a way that will impact in all locations.

Research Design and Data

Our approach is motivated by a focus on polar opposites of context. We contrast places at the furthest poles of the cosmopolitan and provincial divide in order to assess claims of political divergence where this should be most pronounced (consistent with a ‘most different cases’ design). These processes of uneven development are well-established in Britain. Over a ten year period (2004-13) careful analysis shows that ‘the differences in population growth, the number of businesses, the number of jobs and house price affordability have continued to widen between cities in the South and cities elsewhere in the UK’ (Centre for Cities, 2015:12). Britain is the site for our analysis also because it is evident that cosmopolitan-

shrinking dynamics are already recognized as having significant effects on its politics. Commentators for example have made reflected on how UKIP – a right-wing populist party appears to attract support in declining areas such as Clacton where it has its first and now only UK parliamentary seat but fails to make headway in booming areas such as Cambridge where a very different socially liberal politics appears more prominent (Cliffe, 2014; Parris, 2014). We designed our study to more systematically that potential by identifying a sample of Cambridge-like constituencies (as exemplar cosmopolitan places) to compare with Clacton-like constituencies (as exemplar shrinking places).

Specifically, we used Mosaic geodemographic segmentation classifications (consisting of 69 types in total, listed in Appendix A1) to first identify characteristics of the Cambridge and Clacton constituencies. This approach provided an estimate of the proportion of the populations of each constituency that was classified under each Mosaic type (e.g. ‘Creative professionals seeking involvement in local communities’, ‘Low income communities reliant on low skill industrial jobs’). Total proportions of Mosaic types can be useful in indicating the composition of the local population. While they do not account for the fact that some geodemographic groups tend to be less prevalent in absolute terms, they provide important information on the relative composition of communities compared to other places. We therefore identified those types consistent with theoretical trajectories of cosmopolitan and shrinking destinations, both in their absolute composition and their composition compared to each other. This meant that we did not just select all Mosaic categories that registered the highest absolute proportions for Cambridge-Clacton, and also included some categories based on relative difference (between small proportions). This was an iterative process which enabled us to refine the scheme so that it effectively mapped onto our theoretical argument. The full list of the 14 cosmopolitan and 10 shrinking geodemographic types is reported in Table 1. Having generated this list we then calculated the top-50 scoring English constituencies across those categories. These types corresponded to 55 per cent of the population of the identified Cosmopolitan constituencies and 58 per cent of the shrinking constituencies. (Given that these categories amount to not more than 20 per cent of the full range of 69 possible types, this indicates a distinct group of characteristics that dominate these places).² The list of cosmopolitan and shrinking constituencies is reported in Appendix A2.

² There are more inductive methods of sampling (such as clustering methods) which might have been used to identify particular constituency types, but our approach is directly aligned with our theoretical argument.

Table 1: Mosaic Types in Cosmopolitan and Shrinking Parliamentary Constituencies

<i>Mosaic ID</i>	<i>Descriptor</i>
<i>Cosmopolitan</i>	
C10	Wealthy families in substantial houses with little community involvement
C11	Creative professionals seeking involvement in local communities
C12	Residents in smart city centre flats who make little use of public services
E17	Comfortably off suburban families weakly tied to their local community
F22	Busy executives in town houses in dormitory settlements
G26	Well educated singles living in purpose built flats
G27	City dwellers owning houses in older neighbourhoods
G28	Singles and sharers occupying converted Victorian houses
G29	Young professional families settling in better quality older terraces
G30	Diverse communities of well-educated singles living in smart, small flats
G31	Owners in smart purpose built flats in prestige locations, many newly built
G32	Students and other transient singles in multi-let houses
G34	Students involved in college and university communities
H36	Young singles and sharers renting small purpose built flats
<i>Shrinking</i>	
B6	Self-employed trades people living in smaller communities
B7	Empty nester owner occupiers making little use of public services
B8	Mixed communities with many single people in the centres of small towns
J45	Low income communities reliant on low skill industrial jobs
K51	Often indebted families living in low rise estates
L53	Residents in retirement, second home and tourist communities
L54	Retired people of modest means commonly living in seaside bungalows
M56	Older people living on social housing estates with limited budgets
M58	Less mobile older people requiring a degree of care
N61	Childless tenants in social housing flats with modest social needs

An online survey was conducted using the Populus online panel as part of its regular political omnibus. Fieldwork was undertaken between 25th February and 1st March 2015. The sample was weighted to be representative of the national population of all GB adults (aged 18+), but due to a total sample size of 4,000 was able to include 300 respondents from each of the two sets of fifty constituencies resembling shrinking and cosmopolitan geo-demographic profiles. The survey asked respondents about attitudes to a range of social and economic issues and engagement in and disenchantment with politics as well as providing a range of demographic data about the characteristics of respondents (e.g. education, ethnicity, gender, age, social class, offline and online newspaper readership). It also included questions on current voting preferences and past voting behaviour. (Full details of the survey questions are reported in Appendix A3.)

Our core hypothesis was that distinctive social, economic and political outlooks from citizens would emerge when contrasting cosmopolitan with shrinking urban areas. Within that overall hypothesis there were a series of sub-hypotheses relating to specific dimensions of social and political attitudes and political engagement. Firstly we tested attitudes on social issues by asking if respondents thought that things had “gone too far” in terms of equal opportunities for women, ethnic minorities and gays and lesbians, following the logic that a strong ethic of meritocratic fairness and social liberalism was likely to be present to a greater degree in cosmopolitan areas (Sassen, 2002; 2005). We also sought to measure nostalgia in more general terms, asking respondents whether they would prefer to “turn the clock back to the way Britain was 20-30 years ago” (replicating a survey question trialled by survey organisation YouGov). Our expectation was that cosmopolitans are less likely to be positively oriented towards the past.

Secondly, we assessed attitudes to two political issues closely tied to globalisation and urban change, namely membership of the European Union (EU) and attitudes towards immigration, specifically its benefits to the economy and cultural life. The survey questions used are standard instruments, used in the British Election Study. Our expectation was that because of the stronger connectedness of local social and economic context to global dynamics cosmopolitan residents would tend to be more positive about both the EU and immigration.

Thirdly, we assessed the nature of (non-electoral) political participation in cosmopolitan and shrinking settings, through survey questions that have been used previously in The Hansard’s *Society Audit of Political Engagement* (see for example Hansard Society, 2014) with which we are associated and questions on online engagement pioneered with colleagues at the University of Canberra (Stoker et al, 2014). The aim was to measure “offline” and “online” modes of political engagement, across a spectrum of activities such as contacting elected officials, consumer engagement, support for political parties and campaigns and more direct action in protests (Ekman and Amna, 2012). Our expectation was that citizens in cosmopolitan areas would be more oriented towards online forms of political engagement given their more educated and younger demographic profile.

Finally we asked a range of questions about negativity towards politics. This sought to test whether pervasive citizen disillusionment with politics (Stoker, 2006; Hay, 2007) manifests

itself in different ways in cosmopolitan and shrinking settings. We used a range of survey questions developed in previous work on the basis that political alienation is a multi-layered phenomenon (Stoker and Evans, 2014) and eventually tested citizens' intensity of "anti-politics" using a combined index of these measures. Following Ford and Goodwin (2014) we expected that negativity would be highest in those areas "left behind" by the metropolitan political elites, as their explanation of the rise of populist politics rests on the argument that there is a growing gap between citizens in declining areas and politicians who sit comfortably in the cosmopolitan world.

Analysis

In this section we present descriptive statistics from the survey and regression analyses of the determinants of social and political attitudes and behaviours. This analysis confirms first the expected differences in characteristics of citizens in the two types of area and second that attitudinal patterns diverge largely as expected, but also suggests there are fewer differences in terms of political engagement and anti-politics sentiment than might be expected. Further the analyses reveal that cosmopolitan and shrinking contexts explain *some* of the observed variation in social attitudes and modes of political engagement.

Demographics of Cosmopolitan and Shrinking Settings

As discussed above, our sample is drawn from constituencies in urban England that fit the defined cosmopolitan and shrinking profiles and our results confirm the expected patterns of divergence in their demographics; both directly in the self-reported characteristics of survey respondents and indirectly in characteristics of their local area derived from official statistics (linked to data from the Office for National Statistics at the postcode sector level, units of around 6,000 people). This is shown in Table 1. The cosmopolitan respondents outstrip their shrinking counterparts in terms of the dynamism of their employment resources. In responses to our survey in cosmopolitan settings 63 percent of the respondents describe themselves as working compared to 44 percent in shrinking areas. Some 53 percent of the respondents in cosmopolitan areas appear to have a degree or equivalent level of professional qualification and above compared to 37 percent of those in shrinking areas; while 42 percent of shrinking respondents left school at 16 or before, compared to 26 percent of cosmopolitans. Levels of ethnic diversity are substantially lower in the shrinking areas, with 96 percent of respondents designating themselves as white compared to 80 percent in cosmopolitan areas. We see much the same pattern in the profile of the contexts in which our sample is drawn from (observed at

postcode sector level); with cosmopolitan settings characterised by younger, more ethnically diverse, professional and educated populations that are more likely to be economically active, working in financial services or IT, and be living in social housing

Other interesting differences emerge between cosmopolitan and shrinking settings. Levels of home ownership are higher in shrinking areas, at 73 percent, compared to 61 percent for cosmopolitans where there is a higher proportion of social housing (26 percent). This reflects both the dynamism of the employment market and higher costs of housing. The proportion of households without a car is higher in cosmopolitan areas at 31 percent, against 13 percent in shrinking settings, with the greater urban density of the former perhaps enabling residents to rely on public transport. Some 71 percent of cosmopolitan residents have been on a foreign holiday in the past three years, compared to 54 percent in shrinking areas. Finally residents of cosmopolitan areas are unequivocal about describing where they live as “urban” – with some 97 percent using that designation – whereas just 60 percent of the residents of our shrinking locations describing their area in this way. Central and globally connected areas feel more urban to their residents than those areas struggling to find a role in and connection to the new global order.

Table 1: Demographics of respondents and local contexts of Cosmopolitan and Shrinking settings

	Shrinking	Cosmopolitan
<i>Respondent, self-reported</i>		
Social class: ABC1	54.6	68.4
Social class: C2DE	45.4	31.6
Ethnicity: white	96.1	80.1
Age: 55+	61.9	45.2
Unemployed	3.4	4.0
Working	44.1	62.7
Retired	39.9	25.7
Education: left school at 16 or before	42.0	26.0
Education: degree (or equivalent professional qualification) or above	36.8	53.0
Tenure: owned	72.9	60.5

Tenure: social	12.4	25.8
Tenure: private	12.5	12.0

Context, by postcode sector (via NOMIS)

Social class: ABC1	54.4	61.6
Social class: C2DE	39.2	27.0
Ethnicity: white	96.9	70.3
Age: mean	43.4	36.8
Unemployment rate	3.6	4.3
Economic activity	67.3	72.3
Educational qualifications: none	24.5	15.6
Educational qualifications: Level 4 or above	23.6	41.2
Tenure: owned	70.1	53.0
Tenure: social	12.0	20.4
Tenure: private	15.8	24.3
Sector: public administration	29.6	26.5
Sector: financial services, IT	4.9	14.8
Dwelling: Detached/semi-detached	66.0	31.7
Dwelling: Terraced	19.7	21.2
Dwelling: Flats	13.3	46.0

Political Attitudes and Behaviours in Cosmopolitan and Shrinking Settings

Differences in the demographics of the residents of cosmopolitan and shrinking areas would suggest that they might also display differences in their social and political outlook. The findings from our survey confirm this. The difference between the two areas in social and political attitudes and models of political engagement largely matches the expectations set out in the early part of the paper.

Firstly, the predicted divergence between the populations of cosmopolitan and shrinking areas is observed on issues of equality with the latter more resistant. Some 43 percent of respondents from shrinking settings believe that attempts to give equal opportunities to ethnic minorities have gone “too far”, compared to 31 percent in cosmopolitan areas. There is a similar balance of opinion regarding equal opportunities for women (13 per cent compared to 6 percent) and for gays and lesbians (37 percent to 24 percent). Respondents from shrinking urban areas are also more nostalgic, some 53 percent would like to turn the clock back 20-30 years contrasted against 39 percent in cosmopolitan areas. T-tests of the differences between the means of the two samples (controlling for survey weights) indicate that these are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Cosmopolitans are more receptive to social liberalism – in their attitudes towards ethnic diversity, gender and sexuality – and are more comfortable with social change. This finding in part reflects the contrasting social contexts of these two sets of places, but also hints at the sorts of politics that they might produce.

Secondly, respondents from the two types of constituency express very different views on the issues of the European Union and immigration. As expected, cosmopolitan residents have a more positive outlook on both fronts. More than 50 percent of the respondents from shrinking areas believe that immigration is bad for the economy and culturally undermining; whereas closer to 35 percent of people from cosmopolitan areas hold those views. Similar proportions of responses are observed for disapproval of EU membership, with 57 percent of respondents from shrinking areas disapproving compared to 35 percent in cosmopolitan areas. Overall, the general picture is as hypothesised earlier, that cosmopolitans have a more outward-looking perspective on the forces and institutions of the global economy, whereas the residents of shrinking urban areas are more negative about those forces and are more opposed to change.

Table 2: Political attitudes in Cosmopolitan and Shrinking settings

Attitudes	Cosmopolitan (%)	Shrinking (%)	T-Test
<i>Social Change</i>			
Equalities for minorities gone too far	31	43	6.51*
Equality for women gone too far	6	13	6.73**
Equality for gays and lesbians gone too far	24	37	9.81**
Would like to turn clock back to 20-30 years ago	39	53	9.42**
<i>Immigration/Europe</i>			
Immigration bad for the economy	35	54	19.72**
Immigration undermines cultural life	32	52	21.91**
Disapprove of EU membership	35	57	24.35**

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Turning more directly to political engagement, Table 3 reports the proportion of respondents indicating that they have participated in particular modes of political action. The evidence suggests that citizens in cosmopolitan and shrinking areas engage in politics in distinctive ways. There is modest commitment to political participation beyond voting in both types of community. The repertoire of participation shows strong similarities for participation in a range of traditional offline methods, with the exception of taking part in a demonstration – where cosmopolitans are significantly more likely to have protested. This matches a pattern that has long been recognised in audits of political engagement (Hansard Society, 2014: 90) with low cost activities such as signing a petition or boycotting goods or services for political or ethical reasons figuring strongly in repertoires of political action and expression. Other slightly higher cost activities such as presenting views to an official, taking an active part in a campaign and joining a demonstration are recorded by about a quarter of respondents from both communities. There are, however, some differences in political activities that take place online. Specifically, cosmopolitans are more likely to share ideas through social media and to have supported an e-campaign. This finding suggests that the cosmopolitan/shrinking schism may be another venue for emergence of a digital divide.

Table 3: Repertoires of Participation

Actions ever undertaken	Cosmopolitan (%)	Shrinking (%)	T-Test
<i>Traditional/Offline</i>			
Presented views to official	27	31	1.07
Signed petition	70	71	0.08
Boycotted	38	42	0.61
Joined political party	18	16	0.48
Joined demonstration	26	19	4.18*
Active role in campaign	27	23	1.20
Stood for office	7	8	0.43
<i>Online</i>			
Shared ideas through social media	33	24	4.93*
Joined e-campaign	40	29	6.62*
Online advocacy	23	19	1.68
Crowd funding	9	6	2.10

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Citizens in cosmopolitan and shrinking places tend to hold contrasting views about trends of social change and are developing their own repertoires of engagement. Despite this, both sets of citizens are very doubtful about the politics that is currently on offer. As Table 4 indicates, both share a lot of the same disaffection towards politics and politicians. Both groups believe that governments can make a difference to the major social and economic problems facing the country but fear that politicians are too self-serving and short-termist. The populations of both cosmopolitan and shrinking areas have little trust in politicians and feel that politicians don't care what people like them think, although that view is slightly more strongly held in shrinking areas. Whereas it could be assumed that residents of declining areas have scope for disappointment with national and global elites, there are broad similarities with cosmopolitan settings (in fact, respondents in shrinking settings are more likely to believe politicians have the "technical knowledge" to solve the problems facing Britain). Indeed their status as "left behind" areas is used to explain their distrust of mainstream politics and their openness to various forms of populist challenge (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). But what is it that is driving

the negativity of cosmopolitan residents? It is possible to suggest that the answer is more likely to lie in the processes of politics rather than failures of delivery. As Table 4 suggests it is the behaviour of politicians and the conduct of politics that is the issue.

Table 4: Attitudes towards Politics and Politicians

Agreement with statement:	Cosmopolitan (%)	Shrinking (%)	T-Test
Governments can't make a difference to the major social and economic problems facing Britain	9	7	0.46
Politics dominated by self-seeking politicians protecting interests of the rich and powerful	67	68	0.03
Little or no trust in politicians	58	63	1.52
Politicians too focused on short-term chasing of headlines	62	68	1.60
Politicians don't care what people like me think	56	64	3.49+
Politicians have technical knowledge to solve the problems facing Britain today	37	46	3.96*
Politics hasn't been able to keep up with the pace of change of society	56	58	0.20

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Exploring the impact of context

So far we have shown that differences are observable between the outlooks of citizens in cosmopolitan and shrinking areas. The idea that political outlooks are different in dissimilar geographical locations is hardly new or remarkable. Spatial clustering of political practices and perspectives could be expected for a variety of reasons (Gallego et al, 2014). The most important factors are probably contextual where through shared experiences and regular interactions people come to see the world through similar lens. It might also be that people self-select into an area they think shares their outlook. The evidence of this point is difficult to assemble but careful studies suggest that self-selection is not made so much on political grounds but rather the processes work through the socio-economic standing, employment and parental status of individuals; that is they self-select but on non-political grounds. In short, context and self-selection work together to produce location effects.

We can explore these issues a little further in our study. Because our survey is a nationally representative sample, we are able to test standard demographic predictors of measures of social and political attitudes alongside the effect of residing in either a shrinking or a cosmopolitan area. Standard works on political outlook and political participation (Verba et al, 2005) would suggest that age will have an influence on attitudes and behaviours. Older citizens tend to participate more regularly but younger citizens are more likely to use online forms of engagement. Younger people might be expected to have more liberal social attitudes. Level of education is another factor that would be expected to matter, with higher education correlated with greater participation and perhaps more liberal attitudes. Social class is another established factor in influencing levels of participation and attitudes by individuals. People holding more professional and managerial roles are generally more likely to participate politically. Household income might also be expected to have an impact on social and political outlook. There are obvious reasons to expect gender differences on attitudes on an issue such as gender equality. Finally, generalised trust in the political system might be expected to influence attitudes to politics and political engagement, with those lacking in trust feeling there is little point engaging or holding more negative views on certain aspects of social and economic change.

Table 5 presents results for an ordinal logistic regression model of responses to the question about whether equal opportunities have gone too far for ethnic minorities, women and gays and lesbians. (The possible response categories are “Not gone nearly far enough”, “Not gone far enough”, “About right”, “Gone too far” and “Gone much too far”, hence the ordinal logistic regression specification, reporting odds ratios instead of log odds. Keep in mind that an odds ratio of greater than one indicates that the odds of expressing a particular attitude are more likely, an odds ratio of less than one indicates they are less likely.) We also estimate an ordinal logistic regression for the cumulative index of responses for these three survey items.³ Focusing on the factors predicting the combined index it is clear that younger citizens (aged between 18 and 34) are more positive about aspects of social change relating to greater equality and significantly less likely to fear that change in these areas has gone too far. The same applies for those who have experienced higher education. Gender is a factor and figures especially prominently in male respondents’ concern about equality as it relates to women and gays and lesbians. Interestingly, respondents on low incomes are less likely to be

³ If factor analysis is instead used to estimate an underlying single factor for the three survey items, and is then modelled using ordinary least squares regression, inferences drawn from the analysis are similar and consistent.

concerned about social equality, driven by positive disposition towards women's equality and gay and lesbian rights. In terms of social class, working class respondents are more likely to believe that equalities for ethnic minorities (and to a weaker extent for women) have gone too far. Most of these findings are consistent with existing knowledge of the determinants of social attitudes. What is important for the argument tested in this paper is that the regression analysis also suggests that residents of cosmopolitan areas are significantly less likely to think that things have gone too far in terms of tackling social inequalities and those from shrinking areas are significantly more likely to express that fear. In short, after controlling for typical predictors of social attitudes it appears that respondents from these distinctive urban areas still differ in their attitudes to social equality. This finding points towards the importance of context in shaping the attitudes of citizens.

A similar analysis holds in relation to attitudes towards membership of the EU, as shown in Table 6. Here the findings show that the likelihood of disapproval of EU membership (on a scale from "Strongly approve", "Approve", "Disapprove" to "Strongly disapprove") is most strongly predicted by lower levels of education, working class (marked C2DE social grades), distrust of politics, white ethnic self-identification and living in a shrinking area. The pattern is replicated for attitudes towards immigration. The results here show that living in cosmopolitan area, holding a degree or equivalent professional qualification (and higher), being aged 18 to 34 are associated with more positive attitudes towards immigration in relation to its impact on the economy and Britain's cultural life. In contrast, white, working class respondents with high levels of generalised political distrust are more negative in their views on immigration. Additionally, living in a shrinking area is associated with a higher likelihood of supporting the view that immigration undermines Britain's cultural life (but with no equivalent effect observed for perceptions of economic impact).

Table 5: Concern about equal opportunities gone “too far”, ordinal logistic regression (odds ratios)

	Ethnic minorities	Gender	Gays and lesbians	Combined index
Age: 18-34	0.432 (0.043)**	0.833 (0.084)+	0.286 (0.028)**	0.388 (0.037)**
Education: Degree	0.698 (0.047)**	0.958 (0.067)	0.832 (0.057)**	0.764 (0.050)**
Education: PhD	0.592 (0.065)**	0.871 (0.098)	0.619 (0.068)**	0.635 (0.067)**
Ethnicity: white	3.281 (0.359)**	0.980 (0.109)	0.750 (0.083)**	1.516 (0.156)**
Gender: male	1.106 (0.064)+	1.751 (0.106)**	1.567 (0.092)**	1.526 (0.085)**
Social class: C2DE	1.262 (0.079)**	1.117 (0.072)+	0.988 (0.063)	1.139 (0.069)*
Household income: ≤£21,000	0.943 (0.060)	0.873 (0.057)*	0.854 (0.055)*	0.871 (0.053)*
Shrinking	1.110 (0.122)	1.042 (0.120)	1.460 (0.164)**	1.266 (0.137)*
Cosmopolitan	0.760 (0.085)*	0.741 (0.083)**	0.866 (0.097)	0.743 (0.079)**
Distrust	1.281 (0.075)**	0.768 (0.047)**	0.872 (0.051)*	0.977 (0.055)
N	4,061	4,061	4,061	4,061
Pseudo R-squared	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (Note: cut-points of the ordinal logistic regression models are not reported.)

Table 6: Attitudes to EU membership and immigration, ordinal logistic regression (odds ratios)

	EU membership: Approve- Disapprove	Immigration: bad for Britain's economy	Immigration: undermines Britain's cultural life
Age: 18-34	0.327 (0.037)**	0.461 (0.046)**	0.503 (0.050)**
Education: Degree	0.544 (0.040)**	0.503 (0.034)**	0.567 (0.038)**
Education: PhD	0.608 (0.072)**	0.692 (0.075)**	0.642 (0.069)**
Ethnicity: white	1.292 (0.159)*	2.162 (0.236)**	2.660 (0.293)**
Gender: male	0.869 (0.055)*	0.639 (0.037)**	0.919 (0.053)
Social class: C2DE	1.444 (0.100)**	1.613 (0.101)**	1.433 (0.090)**
Household income: ≤£21,000	1.212 (0.084)**	1.070 (0.067)	1.003 (0.063)
Shrinking	1.530 (0.180)**	1.127 (0.125)	1.310 (0.144)*
Cosmopolitan	0.812 (0.100)+	0.690 (0.076)**	0.681 (0.076)**
Distrust	1.893 (0.122)**	1.474 (0.086)**	1.421 (0.083)**
N	3,428	3,901	3,879
Pseudo R-squared	0.06	0.04	0.03

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (Note: cut-points of the ordinal logistic regression models are not reported.)

Further analyses, not reported here in detail, indicate that the strongest impact of place can be observed on the broad social and political attitudes described above. In the case of modes of political participation, the strongest drivers of online engagement were being younger (18-34) and holding a degree or higher qualification. Another factor driving new online participation at significant levels was distrust in politics, while working class respondents were less likely to engage in both online and offline forms of participation. Residents in *both* shrinking and cosmopolitan areas were more likely to engage in offline forms of participation compared to other settings, suggesting that the impacts of cosmopolitan-shrinking dynamics may be more

complex than would initially seem apparent. In line with the descriptive statistics presented earlier, levels of distrust in politicians or other negative views towards the practice of politics (as described in Table 2) were found not to be significantly more or less likely in shrinking or cosmopolitan areas. The strongest factors driving anti-political attitudes tended to be being white and male, having a lower level of education and most of all having engaged in online forms of participation.

To summarise: cosmopolitan residents tend to hold more positive views on social equality and Britain's membership of the EU and are more positive about economic and cultural impacts of immigration compared to people in shrinking areas and to attitudes of the population in general. Individuals residing in shrinking areas in contrast are more inclined to feel that moves to give equal opportunities to certain social groups have gone too far and are substantially more disapproving of membership of the EU than cosmopolitans or the general population. They tend to be much less positive about the impact of immigration on cultural life than the cosmopolitans. There are differences in the repertoire of political participation among citizens in the two areas with cosmopolitan citizens engaging in online and protest-oriented political activity. If the new urban dynamics were merely sorting citizens into some areas and out of others then it is having impact on the construction of political attitudes and behaviours. Our analysis supports that claim. Yet we show that living in a cosmopolitan or shrinking area influences your outlook even controlling for other variables that might also be expected to affect political and social attitudes or behaviours⁴. The dynamic of global urban change is creating citizens who are marching to different tunes and in near polar opposite directions except in their shared negativity towards politics and the political system.

Discussion: implications for politics

There are good reasons to argue that the dynamics of political bifurcation that have been identified in Britain are developing parallel paths in other contemporary democracies. Patterns of uneven development with boom areas and declining areas are found in economic geography of the United States⁵ and Europe⁶ in the first decades of the twenty first century. Moreover there are political hints of the working through of parallel dynamics in the rise of

⁴ In analysis not reported here we found detailed postcode district-level effects were relatively absent, so our key claim is the concentration of particular groups in particular sorts of area is having an impact of the practice of politics.

⁵ <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/the-boom-towns-and-ghost-towns-of-the-new-economy/309460/>

⁶ <http://interaktiv.morgenpost.de/europakarte/#5/47.857/15.688/en>

right and left-wing populist parties challenging the mainstream political parties of Europe and in the impact of the “Tea Party” on the Republican Party in the USA. Context creates the condition for action but it does not of course determine action. In this section we explore some of the potential changes in contemporary democracies and their politics that could be stimulated by the cosmopolitan/shrinking division. We present our findings in terms of four propositions.

1. New political cleavages along cosmopolitan and shrinking dividing lines are emerging but will demand new political styles to achieve effective mobilisation drawing on the new bases created

The cosmopolitan/shrinking divide adds to complexity of political cleavages. Winners and losers are being created by the dynamics of emerging shrinking and cosmopolitan areas and as a result there is a material base to the concerns of different types of citizens about the direction of politics that is likely to be sustained for a number of decades. In terms of political and policy preferences it would seem more realistic to assume that citizens in shrinking and cosmopolitan areas are going to have sustained and very distinctive demands over the next few decades. Each side of the cleavage presents an opportunity for political mobilisation but one that maybe limited in their impact unless new political styles and practices are developed.

Citizens of shrinking areas can feel left behind economically and politically. These citizens are deeply negative about politics but are still able to believe it could make a difference. It makes them on the surface a good target for base for populist politics. According to Mudde (2015) the rise of populism can be attributed to four factors. First, many voters see mainstream political elites failing to tackle important issues. Second, many voters see all the parties as the same; bland and boring. The space for populism response is reinforced by the way in which mainstream political parties have developed a cartel approach (Katz and Mair 1995) which has given priority to winning power and bland marketing of politics. Third, voters such as those in shrinking areas - as we have seen - fear that too many mainstream politicians have either capitulated to or actively supported the dynamics of globalisation. Finally the media structure and its preference for interest and newsworthy copy have created a climate for populism.

There is indeed some evidence that populists (sometimes within mainstream parties and more often from outside) are able to take advantage of the context of shrinking locations. It is indicative of these political forces at work that right-wing populists - the more prominent force in Europe - tend to take a strong stance against immigration and social liberalism and oppose globalising institutions such as the EU. The connection with the outlook of many citizens in shrinking areas is clear. Left-wing populism - which is more in evidence in Southern Europe – tends to be more dispersed across shrinking and cosmopolitan places and focuses more on opposition to the impact of the financial crisis and austerity measures. It too rests on belief that global and national elites have off-loaded economic and fiscal problems created by them onto ordinary citizens.

Of course what is not clear is the long-term capacity of populists to impact or change the condition of shrinking locations. And that is the potential limitation to this political style. If our analysis however is correct populism has a material base and although it may reinvent its institutional expression it is unlikely to disappear: the material base persists and there will always be political space for some party or campaign group to present themselves as carriers of those concerns. Once a populist, always a populist; there is no point moving to the middle ground and if you do someone else will take your place. From the perspective of generating policy solutions to the problem of shrinking locations this cycle may be more negative than positive in its consequences

The prospects of a growing cosmopolitan group of citizens - more international and more socially liberal - has been identified as the dominant wave of the future (Giddens, 2002; Beck, 2006; Held, 1995). There are some issues in tying down what is included in the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship but at its core is a comfort with diversity, global engagement and a socially liberal outlook on core moral and value issues in society. Cosmopolitans therefore may tend to be less nationalistic, more international and more strong advocates of ‘a live and let live’ mentality. These different facets of cosmopolitan outlook are not always likely to be consistently present and they can be difficult to measure but in a broad sense they are reflective of many of the values found in our survey among residents of cosmopolitan areas. Norris’s (2000: 176) review of the evidence across a range of contemporary democracies concludes that ‘cohort analysis suggests that in the long-term public opinion is moving in a more internationalist direction’ with each generation increasingly seeing ‘themselves as cosmopolitan citizens of the globe, identifying with their continent or the world as a whole’.

The evidence of increased engagement using online tools by cosmopolitan citizens might be understood as more than a change of technology and rather as a fundamental shift in political style. Heimans and Timms (2014) distinguish between old power and new power. Old power is hoarded by the few, structured and ordered and leader-driven. It is an established model of political organising for parties, interest groups and campaigns. But new power is more ‘open, participatory, and peer-driven. It uploads, and it distributes. Like water or electricity, it’s most forceful when it surges. The goal with new power is not to hoard it but to channel it.’ New power finds expression in the online campaigns and protests that can be observed in cosmopolitan areas. The practice of politics becomes more fluid so ‘while people with a new power mind-set are quick to join or share (and thanks to new power models, “joining” is easier than ever), they are reluctant to swear allegiance’ (Heimans and Timms, 2014). Traditional parties and interest group organisations will need to adapt to this new style of politics.

Cosmopolitans - as much as those moving to support right-wing populism from the context of a shrinking urban setting or left behind - are not convinced by the capacities of national or even global elites. The evidence from our survey shows a parallel and strong distaste for several aspects of modern politics among residents of cosmopolitan areas. Cosmopolitan places may be occupied by citizens who are more positive about social change and less concerned about immigration and the EU but they are still a difficult group for mainstream politicians to reach. They are often educated, critical citizens with a repertoire of non-traditional political engagement and news consumption. These cosmopolitan residents do not necessarily buy the politics on offer which is not part of the discursive, technocratic and fast-moving world which their social and work context appears to offer. The politics of sound-bites and policy-on-the-hoof can seem naive in comparison to them. Bureaucratic, centralised party systems just cannot easily find the way to reach large parts of this group and build a political project around them.

2. National political elites may try to build different coalitions in response to the cosmopolitan/shrinking divide but there will be strong the limits to their capacity to do so

Politics has for long been about building coalitions across groups and socio-economic cleavages but the polar differences between shrinking and cosmopolitan groups make this standard political practice difficult. Advisors may recommend ‘embracing changes that are, by and large, good for the country without alienating or abandoning those who feel shut out by or hostile to them’ (Cliffe, 2015) but delivering on that advice for mainstream politics may be near impossible. The electoral strategy flowing from this advice would be a variation of a long established political practice: pitching policies aimed at both sets of voters. So right-of-centre parties will need to make sure they reach out to ethnic minorities and not pander too much to fears about immigration expressed in shrinking areas, although they will need to address some of those issues of concern about the impact of immigration. Left-leaning parties will need not to take their traditional support in shrinking areas for granted and work hard at mobilising the young cosmopolitan vote to their cause. All parties need to take on board the emerging strength of cosmopolitan areas and pitch themselves in a way that recognises the liberal, progressive outlook of many citizens in those areas but also adapt to their different style of doing politics.

Yet we have seen public opinion in cosmopolitan and shrinking areas appears to be heading in opposite directions on key social and economic issues making the simultaneous offer of appeals to these groups problematic. Added to another key finding that that neither citizens of cosmopolitan nor left behind areas have much time for mainstream politics and the dilemma for political elites starts to look acute. Voters are alert to political triangulation and spin, and on both sides view them with disdain. For a mainstream party to trim on issues such as immigration ‘is a losing strategy as the votes that are potentially won by shifting closer to the populist position are balanced by those lost from more moderate voters, alienated by a move from the centre’ (Chwalisz, 2015: 9). You cannot be against immigration and then expect those who live in economies that thrive on it to rush to vote for you. More generally moving into populist terrain is a strategy with limitations. The evidence we have thus far is that populists whether sharing power or effectively excluded from office retain their radical and distinctive policy positions and although larger mainstream parties can steal some of their policy positions they cannot move too far for fear of alienating moderate voters (Akkerman and de Lange, 2012; Akkerman and Rooduijn, 2014).

The sense of confronting a “Catch-22” for mainstream politics can be further heightened by recognising other broad political trends that feed into how best they can respond to the new cleavages emerging in response to changing urban dynamics. The key points are that levels of electoral volatility have increased (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000), while voters have become “dealigned” from parties and less reliable in their support. At the same time the issue agenda has become both more post-materialistic (Inglehart 1990), moving beyond traditional left-right party competition on taxation-spending, and so the number of issues on the agenda has proliferated. The increasingly fragmented and volatile issue agenda of national politics is accentuating by the emerging the divide between cosmopolitan and shrinking areas, leaving policy-makers with an increasing number of issues on which there is no middle ground. For example, higher levels of education are associated with a more diverse and unstable public agenda while the rise of post-materialist issues like the environment and niche issues such as immigration have displaced the traditional dominance of the economy, defence and foreign affairs as the focus of public concern. Yet the capacity of government to deal with issues has not increased at the same pace leaving pressure on the political agenda leading to more rapid turnover and reinforcing pressures towards greater volatility (McCombs and Zhu, 1995).

3. Local and regional politics will be more prominent in the governance of many cities but urban leaders will struggle to combine electoral and policy success

The significance of the division between cosmopolitan and shrinking locations makes the prospects for new and stronger forms of city or regional governance greater. A classic response of the state to extensive uneven development is to push decisions away from the nation state towards the local state (Duncan and Goodwin 1988; Clarke 2013) and this development might fit in with a broader “*reterritorialisation*” of politics in the context of globalisation (Brenner, 1999). During the last two decades in England, for example, enhanced powers have been devolved to the Greater London Authority and to the Mayor of London, while there have been a range “city deals” followed by the creation of new city regional governance structures for areas outside London. Greater Manchester has led the way with a new regional governance structure and an elected mayor to be established in 2016 and other schemes to follow⁷.

⁷ For updates see <http://www.centreforcities.org/>

Returning to the position of urban leaders in the context of global bifurcation as presented here it is clear there are opportunities as well constraints. For those leaders presenting themselves in left behind regions a populist appeal to stand with voters and unite against globalisation and its ills would appear a viable electoral strategy but creating the policy measures and capacity to address issues more directly and positively is likely to be very difficult. Policy measures might be targeted at individuals (for example better education and training for those in shrinking areas) or place-based (for example giving priority to the environmental quality of life in areas left behind by the dynamic of urban development). Neither of these measures is easy to deliver. People-focused policies may be difficult to resource both in terms of the finances required (especially in an era of permanent austerity) and in terms of getting the human resources (the skilled or professional support staff) in the right locations. Place-oriented strategies that mean giving up on growth and accepting decline are not easy to sell. Local elites are also unlikely to be able to deliver on rights-based issues (e.g. same-sex marriage) or globalisation type issues (i.e. immigration), so voters in shrinking areas may end up raging at the political machine even more as it fails to deliver on key issues.

For those seeking election in cosmopolitan areas the necessity to present a programme based on meritocracy, fairness and social liberalism would appear to be essential. Beyond that policy measures to manage growth, sustain cultural life and diversity and deal with the excesses of inequality would seem to be part of the package of politics. For growth-oriented cosmopolitan areas the most likely policy prescription is some greater degree of devolved power to these areas so that civic leaders and citizen organisations can adapt their new power capacity – flexible strategies and mobilisation - to the demands of old power of formal constitutional prerogatives and responsibilities. Again there are likely to be some dilemmas in terms of the degree of autonomy and the issue of redistribution of the wealth created in growing areas and their on-going relationship with “left behind” areas.

4. Global elites will find their neo-liberal preferences challenged by the agendas stemming both shrinking and cosmopolitan areas

The new elite in a globalised world have a perspective that is global rather than national; cosmopolitan rather than parochial. The forces that are creating shrinking and cosmopolitan areas are also allowing for the emergence of a space for a global elite and these ‘new classes

and their associated intellectual elites represent a new cosmopolitan multicultural identity in the making' (Friedman, 2000: 144). Many of these elite appear to be actively interested in global politics and policy and operate as an inner circle in a range of policy networks; comfortable largely in a neo-liberal framing of issues and solutions. As Freeland (2011) argues 'they are becoming a transglobal community of peers who have more in common with one another than with their countrymen back home'. Carroll and Carson (2012) use careful analysis of membership and linkages to suggest that four fora have been particularly important: the Trilateral Commission, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the Bilderberg Conference and the World Economic Forum with its prominent annual Davos meeting.

Any national or regional political party or political organisation that wants to be part of the global elite (the Davos crowd) and the international world view of the future will find it hard to appeal to left behind group or stand on populist anti-elite slogans. A national or urban political actor cannot situate themselves and their country as part of the modern economy and new global order and be seen to pander too much to the "left behind" places and citizens. Yet to ignore those interests may dent their legitimacy and electoral standing of national leaders and so undermine their value to global actors. Global actors despite their own cosmopolitan outlook will find their vision challenged by these left behind communities and it is far from clear that those that live and work in cosmopolitan communities are strong supporters of the broadly neo-liberal world view that appears to emanate from global elites. As our survey findings suggest their political world view is more complex than that. A dynamic of polar change at the very least is likely to lead to a critical questioning of the solutions offered by global economic elites.

Conclusions

Politics is situated locally but also globally and the forces of change are being shaped by a divide between shrinking and growing cosmopolitan urban areas. Using evidence from Britain we have shown that distinctive outlooks on a range of social and political issues emerging from the residents of these areas. Indeed on attitudes to immigration the EU and a range of issues of social inequality the two communities are heading in opposite directions. The one exception is that the citizens of both shrinking and cosmopolitan locations are very negative about politics and the behaviour of political elites. There are good grounds from wider research to argue that the experiences of Britain in terms of economic change and

political reaction are not unique. The bifurcation of urban settings is creating new challenges for advanced democracies.

This paper is firmly empirical about the emergence of cosmopolitan and shrinking cleavages. It is more speculative about the impact of this development on the politics of contemporary democracies in part because of the role of contingency in determining political practices and outcomes. It is far from clear that national political elites and actors will be able to rise to the challenge of the new economic and political context. The public disdain for their actions from both sides of the economic divide limits their scope for action. The new urban divide is setting an agenda that threatens irresolvable dilemmas for national elites and a more uncomfortable policy environment for global elites and a context for local politics that offers potential but also pitfalls. Solutions are far from easy to identify but would seem likely to involve the design of both politics and policy with a more obvious devolved character - with local control and power - and one that engages with citizens in new and different ways.

References

- Akkerman, T and de Lange, S (2012) 'Radical Right Parties in Office: Incumbency Records and the Electoral Cost of Governing'. *Government and Opposition*, 47, pp 574-596
doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2012.01375.x
- Akkerman, T and Rooduijn, M (2014) 'Pariahs or Partners? Inclusion and Exclusion of Radical Right Parties and the Effects on Their Policy Positions' *Political Studies* doi: 10.1111/14679248.121
- Beck, U (2006) *Cosmopolitan Vision*, Cambridge: Polity Press
- Brenner, N (1999) 'Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-Scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union' *Urban Studies*, 36:3, 431-451
- Carroll, W and Carson, R (2003) 'Forging a New Hegemony. The role of transnational policy groups in the network and discourses of global corporate governance'. *Journal of world-Systems research*, IX, 1, (winter):67-102
- Centre for Cities (2015) *Cities Outlook 2015* London: Centre for Cities
http://www.centreforcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Cities_Outlook_2015.pdf
- Chwalisz, C (2015) *The Populist Signal*, London: Policy Network : 9. Available at
<http://www.policy-network.net/publications/4918/The-Populist-Signal>
- Clarke, N (2013) 'Locality and localism: a view from British Human Geography',
Policy Studies, 34:5-6, 492-507, DOI: 10.1080/01442872.2013.862446
- Cliffe, J (2014) Clacton versus Cambridge *The Economist* Sep 6th 2014
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2014/09/englands-cosmopolitan-future>
- Cliffe, J (2015) *Britain's Cosmopolitan Future. How the country is changing and why its politicians must respond*, London: Policy Network <http://www.policy-network.net/publications/4905/Britains-cosmopolitan-future>
- Dalton, Russell J. and Martin P. Wattenberg (2000) *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Duncan, S., and M. Goodwin (1988) *The Local State and Uneven Development: Behind the Local Government Crisis*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Ekman, J and Erik Amna, E. 2012. 'Political participation and Civic Engagement :Towards a New Typology' *Human Affairs* 22, 283-300
- Ford, R and M. Goodwin (2014) *Revolt on the Right* (London: Routledge)
- Freeland, C (2011) 'The Rise of the New Global Elite', *The Atlantic*, January/February
- Friedman, J (2000) 'Americans Again, or the New Age of Imperial Reason. Global Elite Formation, its Identity and Ideological Discourse' *Theory, Culture & Society* 17(1):139-146
- Gallego, Aina Franz Buscha, Patrick Sturgis and Daniel Oberski (2014) 'Places and Preferences: A Longitudinal Analysis of Self-Selection and Contextual Effects'. *British Journal of Political Science*, DOI: 10.1017/S0007123414000337

- Giddens, A (2002) *Runaway World. How Globalisation is Reshaping our Lives* London: Profile Books
- Hansard Society (2014) *Audit of Political Engagement 11. The 2014 Report* London: Hansard Society <http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Audit-of-Political-Engagement-11-2014.pdf>
- Harvey, D. (2012) *Rebel cities: from the right to the city to the urban revolution*. Verso, London
- Hay, C (2007) *Why We Hate Politics* Oxford: Polity
- Held, D (1995) *Democracy and the Global Order* Cambridge: Polity,
- Heimans, J and Timms, H , ‘Understanding New Power’ *Harvard Business Review* (December, 2014) <https://hbr.org/2014/12/understanding-new-power>
- Huang, Tsung-yi, M (2006) 'The cosmopolitan imaginary and flexible identities of global city-regions: articulating new cultural identities in Taipei and Shanghai', *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*,7:3,472 — 491
- Inglehart, R(1990) *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
- Katz, R and Mair, P (1995) ‘Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of the cartel party’. *Party Politics* 1 (1): 5–28
- Martinez-Fernandez,C; Audirac, I, Fol, S and Cunningham-Sabot, E (2012), ‘Shrinking Cities: Urban Challenges of Globalization’ *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 36: 213–225. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2427.2011.01092.x
- Maxwell McCombs and Jian-Hua Zhu (1996) Capacity, Diversity and Volatility of the Public Agenda: Trends from 1954 to 1994, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59 (4), 495-525 (1996).
- Mudde, C (2015) “Populism in Europe: a primer” <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/cas-mudde/populism-in-europe-primer>
- Norris, P (ed) (1999) *Critical Citizens* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
- Norris, P (2000) ‘Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens’, in: Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (eds.) *Governance in a Globalizing World*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 155-177
- Pallogot, K (ed) (2009) *The Future of Shrinking Cities: Problems, Patterns and Strategies of Urban Transformation in a Global Context* Berkeley: Institute of Urban and Regional Development UC
- Parris, M (2014) ‘Tories should turn their backs on Clacton’ *The Times*, September 6th <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article4198515.ece>
- Power, Anne, Jörg Plöger and Astrid Winkler (2010) *Phoenix Cities: The fall and rise of great industrial cities* Bristol: Policy Press
- Sassen, S. (2001) *The global city: New York, London, Tokyo*. (Revised) Princeton University Press, Princeton

- Sassen, S (2002) 'The repositioning of citizenship: emergent subjects and spaces for politics', *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 1(46): 4–25.
- Sassen, S (2005) 'The Repositioning of Citizenship and Alienage: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics' *Globalizations*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 79–94
- Scott, A.J. (2001) Globalization and the rise of city-regions. *European Planning Studies* 9.7, 813–26.
- Scott, A.J and Storper, M (2015) 'The Nature of Cities: The Scope and Limits of Urban Theory' *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 39(1), 1-15
- Soja, E. (2010) *Seeking spatial justice*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
- Stoker, G (2006) *Why Politics Matters* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Stoker, G and M. Evans (2014) 'The "Democracy-Politics Paradox" : The Dynamics of Political Alienation' *Democratic Theory* Volume 1, Issue 2, Winter 2014: 26–36
- Stoker, G, Mark Evans, Jinjing Li and Max Halupka (2014) 'Judging Democratic Politics in Australia: Exploring Citizens' Folk Theories' Paper for "Do Democratic Innovations Matter for Citizens?" Panel, ECPR General Conference 2014, Glasgow, UK September 4-6th, 2014
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and Equality. Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

APPENDICES

Table A1: Mosaic geodemographic categories for the Cambridge and Clacton constituencies.

Category	Cambridge	Clacton	Description
A1	0.07	0.19	Rural families with high incomes, often from city jobs
A2	0.01	1.23	Retirees electing to settle in environmentally attractive localities
A3	0.00	0.25	Remote communities with poor access to public and commercial services
A4	0.01	1.48	Villagers with few well paid alternatives to agricultural employment
B5	2.14	4.43	Better off empty nesters in low density estates on town fringes
B6	0.03	9.89	Self-employed trades people living in smaller communities
B7	0.95	4.43	Empty nester owner occupiers making little use of public services
B8	0.30	4.88	Mixed communities with many single people in the centres of small towns
C9	1.88	0.28	Successful older business leaders living in sought-after suburbs
C10	1.39	0.00	Wealthy families in substantial houses with little community involvement
C11	5.75	0.01	Creative professionals seeking involvement in local communities
C12	0.02	0.00	Residents in smart city centre flats who make little use of public services
D13	0.23	1.25	Higher income older champions of village communities
D14	0.32	0.70	Older people living in large houses in mature suburbs
D15	0.09	0.89	Well off commuters living in spacious houses in semi-rural settings
D16	0.85	1.33	Higher income families concerned with education and careers
E17	4.01	0.15	Comfortably off suburban families weakly tied to their local community
E18	2.14	0.98	Industrial workers living comfortably in owner occupied semis
E19	1.96	0.12	Self-reliant older families in suburban semis in industrial towns
E20	0.69	0.02	Upwardly mobile South Asian families living in inter war suburbs
E21	1.86	1.62	Middle aged families living in less fashionable inter war suburban semis
F22	2.15	0.09	Busy executives in town houses in dormitory settlements
F23	0.61	0.30	Early middle aged parents likely to be involved in their children's education
F24	1.45	0.32	Young parents new to their neighbourhood, keen to put down roots
F25	0.00	0.00	Personnel reliant on the Ministry of Defence for public services
G26	10.37	0.00	Well educated singles living in purpose built flats
G27	1.03	0.00	City dwellers owning houses in older neighbourhoods
G28	0.06	0.00	Singles and sharers occupying converted Victorian houses
G29	11.47	0.00	Young professional families settling in better quality older terraces
G30	0.80	0.00	Diverse communities of well-educated singles living in smart, small flats
G31	2.21	0.00	Owners in smart purpose built flats in prestige locations, many newly built
G32	8.05	0.01	Students and other transient singles in multi-let houses
G33	0.63	1.37	Transient singles, poorly supported by family and neighbours
G34	3.44	0.06	Students involved in college and university communities
H35	2.03	0.49	Childless new owner occupiers in cramped new homes
H36	3.99	0.26	Young singles and sharers renting small purpose built flats
H37	2.44	1.11	Young owners and rented developments of mixed tenure
H38	0.37	0.13	People living in brand new residential developments
I39	0.10	0.00	Young owners and private renters in inner city terraces
I40	0.69	0.00	Multi-ethnic communities in newer suburbs away from the inner city
I41	0.37	0.00	Renters of older terraces in ethnically diverse communities
I42	0.05	0.01	South Asian communities experiencing social deprivation
I43	0.74	1.22	Older town centres terraces with transient, single populations

I44	0.57	1.06	Low income families occupying poor quality older terraces
J45	0.46	3.86	Low income communities reliant on low skill industrial jobs
J46	2.79	1.09	Residents in blue collar communities revitalised by commuters
J47	0.92	2.69	Comfortably off industrial workers owning their own homes
K48	2.23	1.95	Middle aged couples and families in right-to-buy homes
K49	0.13	1.39	Low income older couples long established in former council estates
K50	0.23	0.43	Older families in low value housing in traditional industrial areas
K51	0.28	3.12	Often indebted families living in low rise estates
L52	4.00	4.69	Communities of wealthy older people living in large seaside houses
L53	0.00	8.76	Residents in retirement, second home and tourist communities
L54	0.58	13.58	Retired people of modest means commonly living in seaside bungalows
L55	2.53	1.34	Capable older people leasing / owning flats in purpose built blocks
M56	2.36	5.03	Older people living on social housing estates with limited budgets
M57	0.47	1.39	Old people in flats subsisting on welfare payments
M58	1.56	2.11	Less mobile older people requiring a degree of care
M59	0.58	1.59	People living in social accommodation designed for older people
N60	0.08	0.11	Tenants in social housing flats on estates at risk of serious social problems
N61	0.81	2.81	Childless tenants in social housing flats with modest social needs
N62	0.05	0.00	Young renters in flats with a cosmopolitan mix
N63	0.14	0.00	Multicultural tenants renting flats in areas of social housing
N64	0.04	0.00	Diverse home sharers renting small flats in densely populated areas
N65	0.04	0.00	Young singles in multi-ethnic communities, many in high rise flats
N66	0.07	0.00	Childless, low income tenants in high rise flats
O67	0.03	1.44	Older tenants on low rise social housing estates where jobs are scarce
O68	1.26	1.06	Families with varied structures living on low rise social housing estates
O69	0.05	0.95	Vulnerable young parents needing substantial state support

Total % of selected categories 54.73 58.48

Note: shaded categories indicate those chosen as indicative of cosmopolitan-shrinking dynamics.

Table A2: list of constituencies sampled from the cosmopolitan/shrinking profiles

Rank	Constituencies – Clactons	Constituencies - Cambridges
1	<i>Clacton</i>	Cities of London and Westminster
2	Norfolk North	Chelsea and Fulham
3	Isle of Wight	Wimbledon
4	Totnes	Kensington
5	Louth and Horncastle	Richmond Park
6	St Austell and Newquay	Ealing Central and Acton
7	Norfolk North West	Twickenham
8	Suffolk Coastal	Hampstead and Kilburn
9	New Forest West	Finchley and Golders Green
10	Norfolk South West	Putney
11	St Ives	Battersea
12	Bexhill and Battle	Westminster North
13	Dorset West	Hammersmith
14	Thanet North	Enfield Southgate
15	Tiverton and Honiton	Bristol West
16	Christchurch	Kingston and Surbiton
17	Cambridgeshire North East	Brentford and Isleworth
18	South Holland and The Deepings	Tooting
19	Camborne and Redruth	Chipping Barnet
20	Norfolk Mid	Sutton and Cheam
21	Cornwall South East	Brighton Pavilion
22	Broadland	Manchester Withington
23	Great Yarmouth	Hornsey and Wood Green
24	Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	Holborn and St Pancras
25	Cornwall North	Beckenham
26	Bridgwater and Somerset West	Islington South and Finsbury
27	Boston and Skegness	Harrow West
28	Devon East	<i>Cambridge</i>
29	Waveney	Hove
30	Yorkshire East	Poplar and Limehouse
31	Lewes	Reading East
32	Devon North	Sheffield Central
33	Devon West and Torridge	Dulwich and West Norwood
34	Dorset South	Watford
35	Norfolk South	Islington North
36	Newton Abbot	Hendon
37	Folkestone and Hythe	St Albans
38	Dover	Bermondsey and Old Southwark
39	Thanet South	Brent North
40	Havant	Bath
41	Harwich and Essex North	Esher and Walton
42	Suffolk South	Lewisham West and Penge
43	Eastbourne	Streatham
44	Yeovil	Chingford and Woodford Green
45	Brigg and Goole	Bromley and Chislehurst
46	Berwick-upon-Tweed	Guildford
47	Scarborough and Whitby	Carshalton and Wallington
48	Wells	Ilford North
49	Hastings and Rye	Harrow East
50	Sleaford and North Hykeham	Vauxhall

Table A3: List of survey questions

1. Do you think immigration is good or bad for Britain's economy?

Good for economy

2

3

4

5

6

Bad for economy

Don't know

2. And do you think that immigration undermines or enriches Britain's cultural life?

Undermines cultural life

2

3

4

5

6

Enriches cultural life

Don't know

3. Please say whether you think these things have gone too far or have not gone far enough in Britain.

Attempts to give equal opportunities to ethnic minorities

Attempts to give equal opportunities to women

Attempts to give equal opportunities to gays and lesbians

Not gone nearly far enough

Not gone far enough

About right

Gone too far

Gone much too far

4. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? It is every citizen's duty to vote in an election

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neither agree nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Don't know

5. Have you ever engaged with politics or society via any of the following means?

[Yes, in the past 12 months; Yes, prior to the last 12 months; No, never]

Playing an active role in supporting community-based activities (e.g. children's school, local club or society).

Joined a political party

Presented views to an elected member (local, state or federal)

Taken part in a demonstration, picket or march

Stood for public office

Taken an active part in a campaign or lobby

Boycotted products for political, ethical or environmental reasons

Signed petition

Shared ideas and information through social media

Supported an e-campaign (e.g. using Twitter, Facebook or other social media)

Joined an Online social or political Advocacy Group (e.g. 38 Degrees, Avaaz, etc)

Supported Crowd Funding for a social or political cause (e.g. Seedrs, Crowdfunder, etc)

Other (please specify)

6. Thinking about the problems facing Britain today, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Politicians have the technical knowledge needed to solve the problems facing Britain today.

Politicians in government can make a difference to the major social and economic issues facing Britain.

Politicians possess the leadership to tell the public the truth about the tough decisions that need to be made.

Politicians are too focused on short-term chasing of headlines.

Politics is dominated by self-seeking politicians protecting the interests of the already rich and powerful in our society.

Strongly agree

Tend to agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Tend to disagree

Strongly disagree

Don't know

7. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Politicians don't care what people like me think
Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth
Too many people these days like to rely on government handouts
Politics hasn't been able to keep up with the pace of change of modern society
I don't need to know much about a party's policies when deciding who to vote for

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree
- Don't know

8. Using a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'no trust' and 10 means 'a great deal of trust', how much do you trust politicians. [BES10-13]

- 0 - No trust
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10 - Great deal of trust
- Don't know

9. Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britain's membership in the European Union?

- Strongly approve
- Approve
- Disapprove
- Strongly disapprove
- Don't know

10. Suppose you could turn the clock back to the way Britain was 20-30 years ago, would you like to do so, or do you, on balance, prefer Britain the way it is today?

Turn the clock back

Prefer things as they are today

Not sure